We present a rigorous security analysis of Continuous-Variable Measurement-Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution (CV MDI QKD) in a finite size scenario. The security proof is obtained in two steps: by first assessing the security against collective Gaussian attacks, and then extending to the most general class of coherent attacks via the Gaussian de Finetti reduction. Our result combines recent state-of-the-art security proofs for CV QKD with new findings about min-entropy calculus and parameter estimation. In doing so, we improve the finite-size estimate of the secret key rate. Our conclusions confirm that CV MDI protocols allow for high rates on the metropolitan scale, and may achieve a nonzero secret key rate against the most general class of coherent attacks after 10 7 − 10 9 quantum signal transmissions, depending on loss and noise, and on the required level of security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication technologies, and in particular quantum key-distribution (QKD), are rapidly progressing from research laboratories towards real-world implementations. The ultimate goal is building a network of quantum devices (quantum internet) enabling unconditionally secure communications on the global scale [1] [2] [3] [4] . To this end, QKD has been recently extended to a scenario where two honest users (Alice and Bob) exploit the mediation of an untrusted relay, operated by the eavesdropper (Eve), to establish a secure communication channel [5, 6] . This remarkable feature is made possible by the working mechanism of the relay itself, which activates secret correlations on the users' remote stations by performing Bell detection on the incoming signals and publicly announcing the results [6] . This architecture has been called measurement-device independent (MDI) QKD because, as such, the security of the communication does not rely on the assumption that the measurement devices (which are more exposed to side-channel attacks than other devices) are trusted [5, 6] .
Protocols exploiting quantum continuous variables (CV) have attracted considerable attention, for their potential of boosting the communication rate and for their employability across mid-range (metropolitan) distances [6, 7] . The key rates achievable by CV QKD protocols are not far from the ultimate repeater-less bound for private communication, which, for a lossy line of transmissivity η is − log (1 − η) bits per use [8] . The security of CV QKD, which is very well established under Gaussian attacks and in the asymptotic regime [9] , has been recently generalized to the most general class of coherent attacks as well as to the finite-size setting [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . In this landscape, the problem of establishing the secret key rates achievable by CV MDI QKD in the finite-size setting has not been yet explicitly addressed.
In this paper we fill this gap and provide a rigorous composable-security proof of the CV MDI QKD protocol proposed in Ref. [6] (this proof can then be extended to tripartite [15] and multipartite CV MDI protocols [16] ). The security of CV MDI QKD against collective attacks can be obtained along the lines of Ref. [10] . Then, the extension to the most general class of coherent attacks can be obtained by exploiting the recently introduced Gaussian de Finetti reduction [11] .
Here we apply to CV MDI QKD and improve the proof techniques of Ref. [10] :
1. We present a simpler analysis of parameter estimation that holds under general coherent attacks. Our analysis exploits the recently proven optimality of Gaussian attacks in the finite-size scenario [11] to simplify parameter estimation.
2. We show that in CV MDI protocols, the parameter estimation routine can be performed locally by the legitimate users with almost no public communication.
3. We improve the secret-key rate estimates of Ref. [10] by exploiting a new entropic inequality.
The paper develops as follows. We start in Section II by reviewing the CV MDI QKD protocol of Ref. [6] . Section III is devoted to our new results about parameter estimation and its statistical analysis. In Section IV we present an improved estimation of the secret key rate obtained by applying a new entropic inequality. A comparison with previous works is presented in Section V. To make our results more concrete, numerical examples are presented in Section VI. We finally discuss the relation between security proof and experimental realization and possible improvements in Section VII. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section VIII.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
In this section, we review the CV MDI QKD protocol introduced in Ref. [6] .
The protocol develops in five steps (see Fig. 1 ):
1. Coherent states preparation. Alice and Bob locally prepare 2n coherent states, whose complex amplitudes relay publicly announces a complex value γ = (q Z + ip Z )/2.
Parameter estimation.
Alice and Bob estimate the covariance matrix (CM) of the variables
4. Conditional displacements. Alice and Bob define the displaced variables α = (q A + ip A )/2 and β = (q B + ip B )/2 such that
where
is an affine functions of γ. As shown in Ref. [19] , the optimal choice is to define the functions as
where [20]
We remark that the parameters u ⋆ , v ⋆ can be computed directly from the estimated CM.
Classical post-processing.
The variables X = (q A , p A ), Y = (q B , p B ) represent the local raw keys of Alice and Bob, respectively. To conclude the protocol, the raw keys X, Y are post-processed for error correction and privacy amplification. We assume without loss of generality that error reconciliation is on Alice's raw key.
The CV MDI QKD protocol described above has two main characteristic features. The first is that Alice and Bob does not apply any measurement, as the only measurement is performed by the untrusted relay. This property defines the protocol as MDI [5, 6] . The second feature is that the correlations between Alice and Bob are generated through the variable Z announced by the relay. As explained in details in Ref. [19] , this property allows Alice and Bob to do parameter estimation with a negligible amount of public communication [21] . Therefore, they can exploit the whole raw key for both parameter estimation and secret key extraction.
Finally we remark that, although the variables X and Y have in principle infinite cardinality, in practice they are always specified by a finite number of digits. Furthermore, for the finite-size analysis of the protocol (as well as for other practical issues), one needs to map the unbounded and continuous variables X, Y to some discrete and bounded variables X,Ȳ . The mappings X →X, Y →Ȳ can be realized by an Analog to Digital Conversion (ADC) algorithm. We therefore assume thatX andȲ are discrete variables with cardinality 2 2d (i.e., d bits per quadrature).
III. PARAMETER ESTIMATION
In this Section we discuss how Alice and Bob can estimate the CM of the variables (q A , p A , q B , p B ). Without loss of generality we can assume that these variables have zero mean and the CM has the form
where I = diag(1, 1), and
Clearly, the entries on the principal diagonal of (8) can be estimated locally by either Alice and Bob. It remains to estimate the off diagonal term z. This can be done in three different ways:
1. The traditional way is that Alice and Bob exchange part of the data via a public channel to estimate the correlation terms q A q B and p A p B . Clearly, in order to do so they have to disclose part of the raw key, thus reducing the final secret-key rate. Suppose that, over a total of n signals exchanged, Alice and Bob use m < n signals for parameter estimation, thus allowing an error in the estimation of the order of m −1/2 . Then only the remaining n − m < n signals remain available for secret key extraction (i.e., error correction and privacy amplification).
2. As noted in Ref. [10] (see also [22] ) a rough estimate of the signal-to-noise ratio is sufficient for Alice and Bob to run the error correction routine before performing parameter estimation. Then, a verification step is done to ensure that the initial estimate was accurate enough. In this way Alice and Bob can exploit virtually all the raw data for key generation.
3. For our MDI protocol Alice and Bob can exploit the relations (see Section II)
to obtain
where we have defined
Since the variances q Z , p Z and the covariance q Z p Z can be locally computed by the users, then this implies that Alice and Bob can do parameter estimation without publicly announcing their local data [21] . In conclusion, in this way Alice and Bob can exploit all their raw data for both parameter estimation and secret key extraction.
Here we follow the latter approach because, in contrast with the first approach and in analogy with the second one, it requires only a constant (and hence negligible) amount of public communication. Furthermore, the third approach exploits the very structure of the MDI protocol and therefore appears to be the most natural in this context.
A. Statistical analysis of parameter estimation
We are then left with the problem of estimating the confidence interval associated with the statistical estimation of the CM of (q A , p A , q B , p B ). It is worth stressing that this is a remarkably complex problem in the case of general collective attacks (see Ref. [10] ). By contrast, this task becomes straightforward under the assumption of collective Gaussian attacks. Unlike other authors [23] [24] [25] , our analysis of parameter estimation under collective Gaussian attacks does not rely on the central limit theorem and is therefore mathematically rigorous in the finite-size setting (see instead Ref. [26, 27] for a statistical analysis of parameter estimation in CV MDI QKD that exploits the central limit theorem).
Our analysis is based on the assumption that the
are Gaussian variables. This assumption comes with no loss of generality because:
are Gaussian by definition of the protocol;
• The optimality of Gaussian attacks in the finite-size scenarion has been established in Ref. [11] . This implies that the variables (q A , p A , q B , p B ) can be assumed to be Gaussian without loss of generality;
• In principle, the variables (q Z , p Z ) are not necessarily Gaussian. Notwithstanding, by inverting Eqs. (12)- (15) we can write (q Z , p Z ) as linear combinations of
. Since the latter are assumed to be Gaussian, and since a linear combination of Gaussian variables is also Gaussian, it follows that (q Z , p Z ) are Gaussian variables too.
First consider the estimation of, say, q 2 Z , whose estimator is the empirical variance n −1 n j=1 q 2 Zj . Given that q Zj are i.i.d. Gaussian variables [28] , then the empirical variance is distributed (up to rescaling) according to a chi-squared distribution. Therefore, a confidence interval can be readily obtained applying the cumulative distribution function of the chi-squared distribution, or tail bounds for it.
Second, consider the estimation of the correlation q Z p Z . We apply the identity
whose estimator
is distributed as the sum of chi-squared variables. Therefore, for each chi-squared variable, we can compute a confidence interval, and then obtain a confidence interval for the quantities x, y, and z in (8) by error propagation.
An explicit calculation of the confidence intervals is presented in Appendix C.
IV. IMPROVED RATE ESTIMATION
The security proof against collective or Gaussian attacks can be obtained along the lines of Ref. [10] . Here we present an improved estimation of the conditional smooth min-entropy obtained by applying a new entropic inequality.
We assume without loss of generality that the reconciliation is on Bob's variableȲ . The number of (approximately) secret bits that can be extracted from the raw key is lower bounded by the smooth min-entropy ofȲ , conditioned on the quantum state of the eavesdropper E ′ as well as on the classical variable Z [29] :
where we have also subtracted the information leakage leak EC (n, ǫ EC ) due to error correction. The security parameter ǫ + ǫ s + ǫ EC comprises of three terms: ǫ comes from the leftover hash lemma, ǫ s is the smoothing parameter entering the smooth conditional min-entropy, and ǫ EC is the error in the error correction routine. Since conditioning does not increase the entropy, for any purification ρ n ABE of ρ n ABE ′ Z we have
which implies
A crucial point of the security proof is the estimation of the conditional smooth min-entropy H ǫs min (Ȳ |E) ρ n . Here we present an approach that yields a bound on the min-entropy that is tighter than the one of [10] . For collective (or collective Gaussian) attacks, the state ρ n is a tensor-power, i.e., ρ n = ρ ⊗n . On the other hand, the state that is actually used for key generation is the one conditioned upon error correction being successful. Because error correction has a non-zero failure probability, the conditional state is no longer guaranteed to be a tensor-power. Indeed, the conditioned state has the form
where Π is a projector operator (projecting on the subspace in which error correction does not abort), and p = Tr(Πρ ⊗n Π) is the probability of successful error correction. Let us recall that the security parameter ǫ can be interpreted as the probability that the protocol is not secure (see Appendix A for a review). Therefore, the probability that the protocol is not secure, given that it does not abort, cannot be larger than ǫ/p. This suggests a relation of the form
As a matter of fact we can prove the following Theorem 1 Given two n − qudits states τ n and ρ ⊗n such that τ n = p −1 Πρ ⊗n Π for some projector operator Π and p = Tr(Πρ ⊗n ), then
The proof is presented in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 implies that the state can still be assumed to be a tensor-power upon replacing ǫ → 2 3 pǫ and shortening the secret key by log p − 2 3 pǫ bits, that is,
The conditional smooth min-entropy of the tensor-power state ρ ⊗n can be estimated using the Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP), which yields a bound in terms of the von Neumann conditional entropy [30] :
is also a function of the dimensionality parameter d. The next step in the security proof is to estimate the conditional entropy
Let us first consider the estimation of the mutual information I(Ȳ ; E) ρ . We remark that the latter is upper bounded by the mutual information with the variable X, i.e., I(Ȳ ; E) ρ ≤ I(Y ; E) ρ , since the ADC algorithm cannot increase the mutual information. In turn, the property of extremality of Gaussian states [31, 32] allows us to write the bound I(Y ; E) ρ ≤ I(Y ; E) ρG ≡ I BE , where ρ G is a Gaussian state with same CM as ρ.
To conclude, we notice that the quantity nH(X) − leak EC (n, ǫ EC ) is the number of (non necessarily secret) bits of common information shared by Alice and Bob after the error correction routine. Ideally, in the limit of large block size, ADC with arbitrarily large precision, and perfect operations, this quantity is expected to be equal to nI(X; Y ) ρ , where I(X; Y ) is the mutual information between Alice and Bob. Therefore we can put
where the efficiency parameter β ∈ (0, 1) accounts for all the sources of non-ideality in the protocol. The inequality βI(X; Y ) ρ ≥ βI(X; Y ) ρG ≡ βI AB , where ρ G is the Gaussian state with same first and second moments, follows from Ref. [32] . Notice that β is also a function of n and ǫ EC .
In conclusion, the results presented in this section, combined with the security proof of [10] , yield the following lower bound on the secret key rate:
whereÎ AB andÎ BE are the empirical estimates for the mutual informations, and ǫ PE is the probability of error in parameter estimation.
V. COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS SECURITY PROOF
Our expression for the rate in Eq. (33) can be compared to the analogous expression given in Theorem 1 of Ref. [10] . The first difference between the two expressions is in the term proportional to ∆ AEP (that is the leading correction term in our finite-size analysis), which in Ref. [10] is replaced by [33]
(34) It is clear that ∆
(1) AEP > ∆ AEP , where for small values of p and ǫ the difference is dominated by the term 2 log 2 p 2 ǫ . We emphasize that the fact that with our approach we obtain a smaller finite-size correction ∆ AEP follows from the application of the new min-entropy inequality of Theorem 1.
The expression for the rate in Ref. [10] also includes an additional error term ∆ ent , scaling as n −1/2 log n. In our formulation this terms does no appear and has been somehow incorporated in the efficiency factor β. We believe that our approach provides a better way to model what is done in experimental implementations of the protocol. We remark that ∆ ent is the leading finite-size correction term in the analysis of Ref. [10] .
Finally, we exploit the Gaussian assumption to compute the confidence intervals for parameter estimation. The result (see Appendix C) is that the elements of the CM can be estimated up to a relative error of the order of
with a given overall probability of error smaller than ǫ PR . This result is comparable with that of Ref. [10] : the reason is that, although Ref. [10] considers general collective attacks, the analysis of the parameter estimation is effectively reduced to the Gaussian setting by applying a randomization technique.
Although we obtain finite-size correction related to parameter estimation that are quantitatively similar to Ref. [10] , our statistical analysis is much simpler. This is due to the fact that we exploit the assumption of a Gaussian attack which has been proven to come without loss of generality even in the finite-size setting [11] .
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The expression in Eq. (33), together with the parameter estimation analysis of Section III, allows us to compute the estimated secret-key directly from experimental data for any Gaussian attack (and then extend to general attacks using the results of Ref. [11] ). In this Section, as an example, we compute the rate as function of loss and block size for the case of an entangling cloner attack (depicted in Figure 2 ). We consider two settings:
1. symmetric attacks in which both communication lines from Alice to the relay and from Bob to the relay are wiretapped with a beam-splitter with equal transmissivity τ A = τ B = τ ; 2. asymmetric attacks where the relay is assumed very close to Alice station, τ A ≃ 1.
In both cases, following Ref. [6] , the eavesdropper collects all the loss from the communication lines, and the variable Z is the outcome of a perfect Bell detection performed at the relay. These kinds of attacks have been characterized thoroughly in Ref. [6] , where the asymptotic rate (in the limit of infinite block size) has been computed as:
where the mutual informations are bounded by the results of parameter estimation. In our example we choose the conservative value β = 0.95 [34] [35] [36] [37] . (Notice that in principle the factor β is a function of n and ǫ EC , but for the sake of illustration we assume it to be constant.) Putting q
and the covariances of mutually conjugate quadratures vanish. We also have q Z p Z = 0 and
are the excess noise variances and ω A,B are the thermal noise that Eve injects in the links respectively (see Eq.
(1) of Ref. [6] ). The only non-vanishing displacement coefficients are
that imply
and w 3 = 0. Finally, applying Eq. (C9) we obtain
and similarly, from Eq. (C8),
with t = n −1 8 ln (8/ǫ PE ) (see Appendix C). For collective Gaussian attacks, Eq. (33) is rewritten as
where ǫ ′ = ǫ + ǫ s + ǫ EC + ǫ PE . In Figs. 3, 4 this rate is plotted vs the block size n, for different values of the transmissivities and excess noise for error correction efficiency of β = 95%. The plots are obtained putting p = 0.99, ǫ = ǫ s = ǫ EC = ǫ PE = 10 −21 , hence obtaining an overall security parameter ǫ ′ < 10 −20 . We also put d = 5: with this choice of d the error in the Shannon entropy due to the ADC is less than 1%. The rate is then obtained by maximizing over the value of modulation V M .
For coherent attacks, by applying the results of Ref.
[11] we obtain
where k is the number of signals used for the energy test, K ∼ n and ǫ ′′ = K 4 50 ǫ ′ . In Figs. 3, 4 this rate is plotted vs the block size n, for different values of the transmissivities and excess noise, for error correction efficiency of β = 95%. The plots are obtained for ǫ = ǫ s = ǫ EC = ǫ PE chosen in such a way to obtain ǫ ′′ < 10 −20 . The rate is then obtained by maximizing over k and the modulation V M and for p = 0.99.
VII. DISCUSSION
In the case of coherent attacks, the major bottleneck limiting the rate of secret bits generation per second comes from the classical post-processing, and in particular the active sym-metrization routine, due to the typically large size of the data set. While it has been conjectured that such an active symmetrization might not be actually needed [11] , it remains an open theoretical problem to find a security proof that does not require to perform such a computationally costly operation.
Here we present two arguments supporting the conjecture that the active symmetrization routine may not be actually performed in any experimental realization of the protocol:
1. The active symmetrization routine consists in Alice and Bob multiplying their local raw keys by a random matrix. Since the matrix is invertible and publicly known, such an operation cannot by any means increase the secret key length. Therefore, we deduce that the same secret key rate might be achieved even without performing the symmetrization routine;
2. The symmetrization routine is also instrumental for the energy test. After the symmetrization operation, Alice and Bob estimate the expectation value of the energy from only a relatively small part of the raw key. We notice that Alice and Bob can obtain an even better estimate of the mean energy from the whole raw key. This suggests that the symmetrization step might be avoided without affecting the energy test.
In summary, these two arguments suggest that the requirement of performing the symmetrization routine might be a artifact of the particular technique used to prove the security and therefore might not be strictly required in a practical realization of the protocol.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a rigorous assessment of the security of CV MDI QKD in the finite-size regime. Our results are obtained by applying and modifying the results of Ref. [10] , also exploiting the Gaussian de Finetti reduction recently introduced in Ref. [11] , together with new results on parameter estimation and a new min-entropy inequality. Because of this improvements, our estimate on the secret-key rate is improved with respect to results of [10, 11] .
In doing this, we have shown that for our MDI protocol all the raw data can be used for both parameter estimation and secret key extraction. Such a unique feature is a consequence of the fact that correlations between Alice and Bob are encoded in the variable that is publicly announced by the relay -even though such a variable does not contain information about the secret key (see Ref. [19] ). It might be possible that for the same reason the security analysis of MDI QKD can be further simplified, in particular the energy test and active symmetrization routines. It is worth remarking that standard one-way protocols, in both direct and reverse reconciliation, can be simulated by an MDI one, simply by assigning the relay to either Alice and Bob [6] . For this reason, this unique property of MDI QKD can be readily extended to the one-way setting [19] .
Our statistical analysis of parameter estimation is fully composable and does not rely on the central limit theorem (and therefore is mathematically rigorous in the finite-size setting). Notwithstanding, we do not expect that our approach gives tight bounds on the statistical error induced by parameter estimation. In fact, tighter bounds may be obtained following a different approach, for example by invoking the central limit theorem as in Ref. [26, 27] .
We have shown that it is in principle possible to generate secret key against the most general class of coherent attacks for block sizes of the order of 10 7 − 10 9 , depending on loss and noise, and on the required level of security. Therefore, our results indicate that a field demonstration of CV MDI QKD might be feasible with currently available technologies. In particular, our composable security analysis confirms that CV MDI protocols allow for high QKD rates on the metropolitan scale, thus confirming the results of the asymptotic analysis first discussed in Ref. [6] .
Note added: after the completion of this work, other authors have independently presented a security analysis of CV MDI QKD obtained by exploiting entropic uncertainty relations [38] . Although directly applicable to obtain security against coherent attacks, this approach is known to provide bounds on the secret key rate that in general are not tight.
Ideally, in QKD one would like to obtain a shared key that is truly random and secret to the eavesdropper. The final state of a protocol that successfully distributes s perfectly secret bits would be represented by a density operator of the form
In reality, one can only hope to get as close as possible to such an ideal scenario. Let ρ denote the final state of a given QKD protocol. The extent to which the state ρ approximates the ideal one ρ 0 is often quantified in terms of the trace distance,
The trace distance has several desiderable properties for a good security quantifier [29, 39, 40] . In particular, here we discuss its interpretation in terms of the probability that the generated key is secret. It is well known that the operational meaning of the trace distance is related to the problem of quantum state discrimination [41] . Suppose one is given a black box containing either ρ or ρ 0 , each with probability 1/2. Then any measurement strategy, compatible with the principles of quantum mechanics, allows one to distinguish between the two states up to an error probability [42] 
Let us define a binary random variable U with probability distribution P U = (p e , 1 − p e ). As a matter of fact U characterizes the distinguishability of the states ρ and ρ 0 , that is, between the output of the given QKD protocol and an ideal, perfectly secure one. For example, if the state happens to coincide with the ideal one, we have P U = P sec = (1/2, 1/2). On the other hand, if the state can be perfectly distinguished from the ideal one, P U = P insec = (0, 1).
Putting D(ρ, ρ 0 ) = ǫ we can write
Therefore, the probability distribution of the variable U characterizing the output of the QKD protocol is the convex sum of the probability distribution P sec associated to the ideal output state and the probability P insec associated to a state that can be perfectly distinguished from the ideal one. In conclusion, such a convex sum decomposition of P U allows us to interpret 1 − ǫ as the probability that the output of the QKD protocol is indistinguishable from the ideal one, and thus, for all practical purposes is itself perfectly secure. In other words, the probability that the output of the protocol is not perfectly secure is smaller than ǫ. Assuming the worst case scenario, below we put ǫ equal to the probability that the key is not secret. Taking abstraction on the state and focusing on the protocol itself, this same reasoning is extended to the direct comparison of two protocols E and E 0 , formally represented as completely positive maps, via the diamond norm
where the supremum is over all input states and the maps are extended to including an ancillary system.
Appendix B: Some properties of smooth entropy
One of the main tools for quantifying the security of QKD is the conditional smooth min-entropy. In this Appendix we review some of the main definitions and properties (see [29, 30] for the proofs) and derive a useful inequality in Proposition 6 that is applied for our security proof. 
where I is the identity operator and σ is a subnormalized state.
Here we are interested in the conditional min-entropy of classical-quantum (CQ) states of the form ρ XB = x∈X P (x)|x x| ⊗ ω(x). In this case the conditional minentropy can be written in terms of the maximum guessing probability:
2
−Hmin(X|B)ρ = max E x∈X P (x) x|E(ω(x))|x ,
where E is a quantum channels. The following holds:
Lemma 1 Let ρ = x∈X P (x)|x x| ⊗ ω(x) be a CQ state and S a subset of X . We define the projector operator Π = x∈S |x x|, and the state p −1 ΠρΠ, with p = Tr(ΠρΠ). The following inequality holds:
Proof: By applying the characterization of the min-entropy in terms of the guessing probability we obtain: 
Remark 4
Here we have defined the entropy smoothing using the trace distance as in Ref. [29] instead of the purified distance as done in Ref. [30] . 
and that D(ρ, ρ ⋆ ) ≤ ǫ implies
We then have
where in the first inequality we have applied the triangular inequality and in the last one we have applied Eqs. (B10)-(B11). ✷ We are now ready to present a "smoothed" version of Lemma 1:
To bound the cumulative distribution function we can use, for example, the tail bounds:
